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Foster care caseloads have almost doubled over the last two decades, but the cause of the growth is
poorly understood. We study the role of parental methamphetamine (meth) use, which social workers
have linked to recent growth in foster care admissions. To mitigate the impact of omitted variable bias,
we take advantage of two signicant, exogenous supply-side interventions in meth markets in 1995 and
1997, and nd robust evidence that meth use has caused growth in foster care caseloads. Further, we
identify the mechanisms by which increased meth use caused an increase in foster care caseloads. First,
we nd that treatment for meth abuse caused foster caseloads to fall in situations where a child was
removed because of parental incarceration, suggesting that substance abuse treatment is a substitute
for foster care services and more generally an eective demand-side intervention. Secondly, we nd that
parental meth use causes an increase in both child abuse and child neglect foster care cases. These
results suggest that child welfare policies should be designed specically for the children of meth-using
parents.
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From 1986 to 2008, the US foster care population increased from approximately 280,000 to 
463,000—a  rise  of  over  65%  (US  DHHS  1999a,  2006).  This  increase  in  the  foster  care 
population  has  generated  significant  monetary  and  non-monetary  costs.  Out  of  $22.2  billion 
spent in 2002 at federal, state, and local levels on child welfare programs, about $10 billion was 
allocated  to  out-of-home  placements  for  children,  including  foster  care  and  group  homes 
(Scarbella et al. 2004). The rise in foster care enrollments could lead to large long-term social 
costs. Children in foster care are more likely to have behavioral, psychological, and physical 
health  problems,  and  although  many  of  these  problems  are  believed  to  result  from  the 
circumstances that led the child to be placed in foster care, recent research suggests that such 
problems may be aggravated by the foster care system (Doyle 2007, 2008). 
  Given the growing costs of foster care, it is important to understand why more children 
are  entering  the  foster  care  system,  so  that  policymakers  may  know  where  resources  for 
mediation are best directed. This paper explores the effect of abuse of a particular narcotic, 
methamphetamine,  on  foster  care  admissions.  A  body  of  media  reports  and  child  welfare 
publications has linked methamphetamine (meth) abuse with foster care admissions (see Nicosia 
et al. 2009). While research has explored a broad set of explanatory factors, it is difficult to 
isolate the proximate effect of any particular variable on foster care because of omitted variable 
bias (Swann and Sylvester 2006). 
To measure the effect of meth use on foster care admissions, we collect monthly data on 
foster care admissions, meth drug treatment admissions as a proxy for the number of meth users, 
meth  retail  prices,  and  a  variety  of  other  potentially  relevant  factors  for  US  states  from 
September 1994 through March 2000. Using the deviations in meth prices from national trends  
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caused by large federal supply interdictions in 1995 and 1997 as an instrumental variable, we 
find that a 1% increase in self-admitted meth treatments for whites is associated with a 0.5% 
increase  in  white  foster  care  admissions.  We  focus  on  whites  because  meth  users  are 
overwhelmingly white, and this allows us to conduct a falsification test of our research design 
using the black subsample. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to identify the effect of a 
suspected cause of foster care enrollment using plausibly exogenous variation in drug use. 
  We further investigate the routes that children take into foster care, including parental 
incarceration  and  neglect.  Our  evidence  is  consistent  with  a  negative,  elastic  relationship 
between meth treatments and foster care entries caused by parental incarceration, but a positive, 
inelastic relationship between meth treatments and foster care entries caused by neglect. That is, 
we find both that meth use causes harm to children via increased abuse and neglect, and that 
meth use causes increased admissions to foster care simply via the removal of a meth-using 
parent. Meth treatment is found to have smaller effects on alternative routes. 
We  also  contribute  more  generally  to  literature  on  the  effects  of  meth.  Dobkin  and 
Nicosia (2009) examine the effects of meth on public health outcomes and crime in California. 
Using a similar identification strategy but with only the 1995 interdiction, Dobkin and Nicosia 
estimate that meth-related hospital and treatment admissions fell 50 and 35 percent, respectively, 
but find no statistically significant relationship between meth-related hospital admissions and 
crime. We build upon this strategy by using meth treatment (a less extreme outcome to proxy for 
meth use) and by using both the 1995 ephedrine and 1997 pseudoephedrine regulations, along 
with national data coverage. We do find significant effects of meth use on foster care. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of relevant details of 
foster  care  policy  and  the  foster  care  institution,  the  role  of  parental  drug  abuse  in  child  
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maltreatment and foster care admissions, and the two federal interventions in 1995 and 1997 that 
increased  the  scarcity  of  two  key  meth  precursors.  Section  3  explains  the  data.  Section  4 




Foster care is a social welfare service in the US that serves the needs of abused and 
neglected children. Child welfare workers are called to homes to respond to reports of child 
neglect or abuse. A social worker can remove a child if she determines that remaining with 
parents will jeopardize a child’s welfare. Children are placed either with a surrogate “foster” 
family or in a residential treatment facility called a group home. The purpose in both cases is to 
provide temporary housing in a safe and stable environment until reunification with the child's 
birth parents or legal guardians is possible. Reunification happens once the state is convinced 
that the harmful factors that triggered removal no longer exist (see Barbell and Freundlich 2001). 
The population of children living in foster care has increased dramatically over the last 
few decades. Using data compiled from US DHHS (1999a, 2006a, 2009), Figure 1 shows the 
number of US children living in foster care from 1982 to 2006. There was a stark increase in the 
foster care population from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s caused by a rapid growth in entry 
with no associated uptick in exit. Younger children exiting the system mostly explain the decline 
in foster care after 1999 (US DHHS 2006a).  
A series of federal legislation expanded the federal oversight of child welfare services, 
including foster care. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 was enacted to 
address the growing number of placement transitions for children in foster care. It emphasized  
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family reunification as an institutional priority whenever feasible. It promoted stable, permanent 
placements rather than the multiple placements known as foster care drift. Though these policies 
temporarily stabilized the entry rate, eventually entry rates increased again. In 1993 Congress 
passed  the  Family  Preservation  and  Family  Support  Program/Promoting  Safe  and  Stable 
Families Program. This act doubled federal funding for family preservation and support services. 
In 1997, the program was reauthorized as part of the larger Adoption and Safe Families Act that 
was structured to address the difficulty of placing special needs children from foster care into 
adoptions. This legislation brought a new strategy shift toward protecting child health—even if 
the child’s health came at the expense of parental reunification (Barbell and Freundlich 2001). 
Foster care placements have grown for a number of reasons. Reports of child abuse and 
neglect  grew  from  1.1  million  reports  in  1980  to  almost  3  million  in  1999  (Barbell  and 
Freundlich 2001). Foster care and group homes are increasingly used as an alternative to mental 
health and juvenile justice institutions. Landsverk and Garland (1999) estimate that between one-
half and two-thirds of all children entering foster care have mental health disabilities that warrant 
mental health treatment. An increase in parental incarceration, and presumably the incarceration 
of  mothers,  helps  explain  a  major  portion  of  the  rise  in  foster  care  placements  (Swann  and 
Sylvester 2006). Since families on welfare constitute a large share of families who enter the child 
welfare system, welfare reform legislation may have had an effect on foster care caseload flows 
through its effect on the labor force participation of poor mothers (Paxson and Waldfogel 2002). 
We examine the role of parental drug use in explaining the growth of foster care admissions. 
 
Parental drug abuse and child maltreatment  
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Parental  substance  abuse  is  one  of  the  most  significant  risk  factors  associated  with  child 
maltreatment and entry into foster care. The US DHHS (1999b) report that approximately 10–
20% of children prenatally exposed to drugs enter foster care at or around their birth and another 
third  enter  within  a  few  years.  Parental  substance  abuse  can  increase  foster  care  levels  by 
lengthening stays in foster care (Fanshel 1975), increasing noncompliance with child welfare 
treatments (Famularo et al. 1989), and lowering the likelihood of reunification with the child 
(Walker, Zangrillo, and Smith 1994). 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, crack cocaine became widespread in US urban 
areas. From 1986 to 1991, the average number of children in foster care increased nationwide 
53%, but that 50% of that overall growth was driven by only three states: California, New York, 
and Pennsylvania, all three of which were at the epicenter of the crack epidemic (US GAO 
1994). The proportion of children with health problems and prenatal exposure to drugs in these 
three states also increased from 1986 to 1991. In a broad sense, the meth epidemic followed the 
crack epidemic chronologically, but affected very different populations. 
Our  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  parental  meth  abuse  and  child 
maltreatment is considerably less developed than it is for parental abuse of alcohol and cocaine. 
Most  of  the  evidence  today  is  either  measures  of  perception  by  child  service  workers  or 
deductions from what is known about parental substance abuse in general. For example, a 2005 
survey of 300 counties by the National Association of Counties found that 40% of child welfare 
officials reported increases in out-of-home placements in the last year due to meth abuse in their 
communities (National Association of Counties 2005). 
A  2006  report  prepared  for  the  US  Center  for  Substance  Abuse  Treatment  identifies 
channels  by  which  parental  meth  use  may  harm  children:  episodic  meth  use,  chemical  
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dependency on meth, prenatal exposure to meth, exposure to meth if parents work in toxic labs, 
and exposure if parents are employed as traffickers (Otero et al. 2006). 
  Most cases of child maltreatment are believed to be cases of neglect and physical abuse 
caused by episodic parental use. Parental meth abuse can pose dangers to children in the form of 
poor  judgment,  increase  violence,  failure  to  provide  adequate  supervision,  and  a  variety  of 
deteriorated  living  conditions  (Gonzalez  et  al.  2010).  The  little  that  is  known  about  the 
relationship between parental meth abuse and child health comes from our broader knowledge of 
the correlation between substance abuse in general and child maltreatment (Kelleher et al. 1994; 
Famularo  et  al.  1992).  Prenatal  exposure  studies  that  focus  on  all  substance  abuse,  such  as 
McNichol (1999) who found that 62% of infants exposed to parental substance abuse during 
gestation had significantly more health and care giving needs, are also oftentimes used to predict 
the effects of meth on child outcomes. Meth users are more likely to be female and single parents 
living alone with their children, so there is reason to believe that parental meth use will have 
damaging  effects  on  child  outcomes  given  our  broad  knowledge  about  the  causal  effect  of 
substance abuse on child outcomes in general (Brecht et al. 2004; Gonzales et al. 2010). 
While parental meth abuse and child maltreatment are highly correlated, researchers are 
unsure as to whether the relationships are spurious due to unobserved heterogeneity or due to 
complex pathways by which parental meth consumption causes child maltreatment. Meth use is 
correlated with use of other substances, such as alcohol, marijuana, and tobacco (we show this 
below). Antisocial personality traits are associated with substance abuse and are themselves risk 
factors for child maltreatment (Kelleher et al. 1994). Reverse causality may be a concern if other 
factors  lead  to  maltreatment,  possible  removal  of  a  child,  and  in  turn  causes  the  parent  to 





Due in part to the low price of methamphetamine and its addictive qualities, the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (2006) warns that meth may be more heavily used than crack 
cocaine,  LSD,  PCP,  ecstasy,  and  inhalants  in  the  US.  Public  health  indicators,  such  as  the 
number of meth-related emergency-room visits, show meth as a growing national issue (Nicosia 
et al. 2009). Meth abuse first showed signs of being a problem on the West coast. Over the 
1990s, meth use intensified in those originating states and expanded eastward across the US. In 
Figure 2, we show these changes over time by calculating the annual rate of admissions to 
treatment facilities for meth for September 1994 to August 1995 (the top map) and April 1999 to 
March 2000 (the bottom map).  
The  social  costs  of  meth  are  borne  by  many  non-users.  A  recent  study  by  the  Rand 
Corporation estimates that the total social costs of meth were $23.4 billion in 2005, which the 
authors attribute to the cost of drug treatment, health care, deaths, lost productivity, crime, child 
endangerment, and harm to the environment (Nicosia et al. 2009). Many law enforcement and 
social  work  practitioners  make  a  strong  connection  between  the  rise  of  meth  abuse  and  the 
expanding  number  of  children  in  foster  care,  but  our  study  is  the  first  to  estimate  a  causal 
relationship.  
There  are  different  varieties  of  meth:  dextrorotatory  methamphetamine  (d-meth), 
levorotatory  methamphetamine  (l-meth),  and  racemic  methamphetamine  (dl-meth).  The 
preferred street meth is the d-meth variety, a highly addictive stimulant that affects the central 
nervous system by releasing dopamine and adrenaline. The effects of d-meth include increased 
energy and alertness, decreased appetite, intense euphoria, and impaired judgment, all of which 
can last up to 12 hours (Rawson and Condon 2007). Long-term meth use can lead to psychotic  
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behaviors  including  paranoia,  visual  and  auditory  hallucinations,  insomnia,  and  aggression 
(Rawson et al. 2002). 
Meth  is  synthesized  from  a  reduction  of  ephedrine  or  pseudoephedrine,  the  active 
ingredients in commonly used cold medicines. The chemicals used in synthesis are available in 
household products, and the process is extremely toxic. Meth is unique among illicit drugs for 
the  concentration  of  the  market  for  its  precursor  chemicals.  As  of  2004,  nine  factories 
manufactured the bulk of the world supply of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (Suo 2004).  
Since these precursors are distributed and packaged in different forms, the history of 
precursor  control  is  one  in  which  meth  producers  innovate  around  narrow  restrictions  on 
precursors created by federal legislation.
1 In 1988, Congress passed the Chemical Diversion and 
Trafficking Act, which gave the DEA the authority to control the diversion of precursors used to 
produce illegal drugs, such as meth, LSD, and PCP. The statute required bulk distributors of 
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine to notify drug enforcement authorities of imports and exports 
and keep records of purchasers (Suo 2004; US DEA 1997). All tablet forms of ephedrine and 
pseudoephedrine medical products, however, were exempt—a legal loophole that was heavily 
exploited by drug trafficking organizations. 
The primary sources of precursors following the 1988 regulation were wholesale and 
mail  order  distributors  of  ephedrine  tablets.  In  the  early  1990s,  there  was  little  use  of 
pseudoephedrine as a precursor. In 1994, ephedrine was identified as the source material in 79% 
of meth lab seizures, while pseudoephedrine was only found in 2% (Suo 2004). Congress sought 
to close the legal loophole in 1993 by passing the Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act, 
which became effective August 1995. This new regulation provided additional safeguards by 
                                                 
1 States have regulated meth precursors, but primarily after our sample period ended.  
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regulating the distribution of products that contained ephedrine as the only active medicinal 
ingredient  (US  DEA  1995;  Cunningham  and  Liu  2003). T he  new  legislation  ignored 
pseudoephedrine  tablets,  so  traffickers  soon  took  advantage  of  the  omission  by  substituting 
towards pseudoephedrine as a precursor. By 1996, pseudoephedrine was found to be the primary 
precursor  in  almost  half  of  meth  lab  seizures  (US  DEA  1997).  From  1996  to  1997, 
pseudoephedrine imports grew by 27% while sales of all cold medications grew only 4% (Suo 
2004). As a consequence, the DEA sought greater controls over pseudoephedrine products. The 
Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996 went into effect between October and 
December 1997 and required distributors of almost all forms of pseudoephedrine to be subject to 
chemical registration (US DEA 1997). 
Due to the concentration of meth precursor markets, these two regulations may be the 
largest supply shocks in the history of US drug enforcement (Dobkin and Nicosia 2009). To 
estimate the effect of the interdictions on meth markets, we construct a monthly series for the 
expected price of a pure gram of d-meth from September 1994 to March 2000 using the DEA’s 
seizure database, System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE).
2,3 Figure 3 
shows various percentiles of the monthly expected price distributions for retail meth transactions 
in the US.
4 The 1995 interdiction caused a dramatic spike in meth prices, but the effect was 
relatively short lived. After six months, the prices returned to their pre-interdiction levels. The 
                                                 
2 Drug producers and distributors can alter the purity of retail narcotics to respond to market conditions 
(just as they vary the price). In order to compare prices over time and across local markets, it is necessary 
to estimate the expected price of a pure gram of a drug. These estimates come from random coefficient 
models of both purity and price, following the methodology of Arkes et al. (2004). Estimates from these 
models are available from the authors. Prices are inflated to 2002 dollars by the All Urban CPI series. 
3 There is a debate about the ability of researchers to recover the distribution of market prices from 
STRIDE because its sampling is determined by law enforcement actions. See Horowitz (2001) for the 
critical argument and Arkes et al. (2008) for a rebuttal. 
4 Retail transactions for meth are defined as those with a net weight between zero and 100 grams. This 
definition is based on the market quantity levels estimated in Arkes et al. (2004). For powder cocaine and 
heroin, a similar definition of retail would be 0–10 grams.   
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1997 regulation had a smaller but more sustained effect on prices—lasting approximately 12 
months.  It  is  these  rapid  shocks  to  the  supply  and  market  price  of  meth  that  we  exploit  to 
understand its effects on foster care admissions. Figure 4 shows how meth prices were unique in 
their response to these interventions. There is no similar movement in the median prices for 
heroin or cocaine (relative to their medians in September 1994). 
We  let  the  meth  price  data  date  the  interventions  precisely.  We  estimate  quadratic 
national  price  trends,  and  measure  when  the  prices  deviate  from  the  price  trends  after  each 
intervention.
5 Figure 5 demonstrates graphically how we date the interventions in this way. The 
1995 intervention is in effect in August 1995, and we observe a deviation from the price trend 
between September 1995 and February 1996. The 1997 intervention comes into effect between 
October and December 1997, and we observe a deviation from the price trend between April 
1998  and  March  1999.  Dobkin  and  Nicosia  (2009)  use  a  four-month  window  for  the  1995 
intervention,  but  they  limit  their  attention  to  California  where  the  meth  market  is  the  most 
sophisticated and producers are arguably more adaptable. Cunningham and Liu (2003, 2005) use 
six  months  for  the  1995  intervention  (August  1995–January  1996).  Our  empirically  driven 
timings for the supply shocks are consistent with these previous studies. 
 
3 Data sources and descriptive statistics 
We use a variety of data sources to study the effect of meth abuse on foster care admissions. We 
choose a sample period of September 1994 to March 2000 for all datasets. This starts one year 
before  the  first  intervention  and  ends  one  year  after  the  second  intervention.  The  level  of 
variation for our analytic sample is state by month. 
                                                 
5 Estimates from these models are available from the authors.  
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Foster  care  enrollment  data  come  from  the  Adoption  and  Foster  Care  Analysis  and 
Reporting  System  (AFCARS).  AFCARS  is  a  federally  mandated  database  that  aggregates 
detailed case information on each child in foster care and each child who has been adopted under 
the authority of all state child welfare agencies (National Data Archive on Child Abuse and 
Neglect 2002).
6 State participation began voluntarily in 1994, and by mandate in 1998. For each 
child in foster care in a particular year, states must report the date a child first entered and most 
recently entered into the foster care system, as well as demographic data such as the child’s age, 
gender,  and  ethnicity.  AFCARS  is  also  valuable  because  it  indicates  whether  a  child  was 
removed as a result of neglect, physical abuse, parental drug abuse, parental incarceration, etc. 
Since AFCARS does not represent a balanced panel of states during our sample period, 
but does report the first time a child entered foster care, we create a retrospective variable of first 
entry. We attempt to remove duplicate child observations across years by matching children 
based  on  state of  supervision,  first  removal  date,  and  date  of  birth.  Using  this  retrospective 
definition, we build a balanced panel of new foster care admissions by state and month from 
September 1994 to March 2000. Figure 6 shows the number of first entries into, latest entries 
into, and discharges out of foster care by month during the 1994–2000 sample period. The figure 
shows that the retrospectively measured first entry variables tracks well with the latest entry 
measured during the late part of the sample period when all states participated in AFCARS. 
Route  of  admission  into  foster  care  is  only  reported  for  the  latest  entry,  so  we  are 
restricted to the unbalanced panel of participating states. Child welfare workers can report more 
than one reason for removal. For each category, we classify a child as following that route if it 
ever shows up in his file. Thus, the route of admission proportions can add up to more than one.  
                                                 
6 AFCARS consists of two separate data files for foster care and adoption records. Throughout this paper, 
we use AFCARS to refer to the foster care file only.  
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Selected descriptive statistics from the foster care data are presented in Table 1. Although 
the majority of foster care children are white, black children are greatly overrepresented in the 
foster care system; they constitute over 40% during our sample period. Females and Hispanics 
make  up  48%  and  18%  of  the  total  foster  care  population,  respectively.  The  average  child 
entering  foster  care  is  typically  young  (6.9  at  first  entry,  7.2  at  latest  entry),  and  has  been 
removed  1.3  times.  The  most  commonly  cited  reason  for  removal  was  child  neglect  (52%), 
followed by physical abuse (17%) and parental drug abuse (16%). Parental incarceration was 
cited in 5% of all cases. Figure 7 shows the trends in route of admission during the 1994–2000 
sample  for  the  white  children  who  comprise  our  analytic  sample.  Parental  drug  abuse  and 
incarceration are relatively rare, but they have the most growth during the sample. 
Since there is no direct measure of meth use, we use the number of meth treatment 
admissions as a proxy. These data come from the Treatment Episode Data Set, which records the 
universe  of  all  treatment  admissions  to  federally  funded  inpatient  or  outpatient  facilities.
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Admitted patients are interviewed for their primary, secondary, and tertiary substances used prior 
to  entry,  from  which  we  calculate  measures  of  treatment  for  five  substances:  alcohol, 
cocaine/crack, marijuana, heroin, and meth. Table 2 shows the characteristics of drug treatment 
patients  in  TEDS  during  our  sample  period.  Meth  is  mentioned  in  8%  of  TEDS  treatment 
admissions. 
The  second  column  of  Table  2  shows  how  meth  treatment  patients  differ  from  the 
population of patients. Meth users are more likely to be white and less likely to be black. Blacks 
constitute only 3% of meth treatment patients. For this reason, we restrict our analytic sample to 
whites, and use the black subsample for a falsification test. Meth users have a referral profile that 
                                                 
7 TEDS consists of two separate data files for admissions (TEDS-A) and discharges (TEDS-D). In this 
paper, we use TEDS to refer to the TEDS-A file.  
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is qualitatively similar to the population’s. About a third of patients are self-admitted. Thirty-
seven percent of meth patients are referred by the criminal justice system. 
Figure 8 shows the secular trends for whites in treatment for meth, juxtaposed with the 
trends for cocaine and heroin. Meth has the largest percentage rise in treatment in-flows. A drop 
in treatment in-flows is also apparent during the two precursor intervention periods. 
We  calculate  foster  care  and  meth  treatment  rates  at  the  state-by-month  level  by 
weighting each value by the population of 15-49 year olds by race. As most of our analysis 
focuses on whites, the weight is the number of white 15-49 year olds by state and month. These 
population estimates are state-race-month linear interpolations from the Bureau of the Census. 
Table 3 shows the per capita measures of meth treatment and foster care admissions that we use 
for our analysis. Using the first (latest) entry variable, there are 24.24 (34.77) children in foster 
care per 100,000 white children aged 0–19 years. Disaggregated by route, 2.01 white children for 
every 100,000 are in foster care due to parental incarceration, 14.65 due to parental neglect, 4.75 
due to parental drug abuse, 6.22 due to parental abuse, and 11.86 to all other causes. The number 
of whites seeking treatment for meth is 12.09 per 100,000 whites aged 15–49 years, and the 
number who enter into treatment on their own accord is 2.88 per 100,000. 
We include a number of controls to address potential confounds to identification. Meth 
use may be correlated with other drug use, so we include the rate of alcohol abuse treatment for 
whites from TEDS. In some robustness checks, we also include the cocaine and heroin rates for 
whites. Meth use may be a function of local economic conditions, so we control for the state 
unemployment  rate  estimated  from  the  Current  Population  Survey.  (The  BLS  does  not 
disaggregate these statistics by race, so we control for the overall unemployment rate.) Finally, 
we include a relatively exogenous measure of the price of a substitute drug. Orzechowski and  
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Walker  (2008)  report  the  cigarette  taxes  in  each  state.  Descriptive  statistics  for  all  of  these 
controls can be found in Table 3. 
 
4 Model and identification 
In this section, we develop an empirical approach that examines the extent to which the increase 
in meth use can explain changes in foster care admissions. Further, we use data on the reasons 
for a child’s removal to identify the precise mechanisms that translate the growth in meth use to 
an increase in foster care admission rates. 
We proxy for meth use with the number of self-referred cases of meth treatment so as to 
avoid any endogeneity with criminal justice referrals and law enforcement efforts that may have 
occurred during the 1995 and 1997 interdictions. As TEDS is the joint function of both substance 
abuse levels and the number of individuals seeking treatment in the state/month, interpretation 
can be a challenging task when an intervention causes treatment and consumption to diverge. 
Spikes in real prices, for instance, would be expected to decrease consumption, either because 
new users would be less likely to experiment with meth for the first time or because old users are 
income constrained. But spikes in price cause increases in the demand for treatment if treatment 
is used to reduce consumption. By focusing on the separate routes of admission into foster care, 
though, we were able to disentangle some of these effects. 
We employ a two-stage least squares methodology to estimate the effect of meth on 
foster care enrollments because the number of meth users and foster care admissions may be 
jointly determined by unobserved factors and subject to reverse causality. This sign of the bias of 
OLS  is  indeterminate  because  these  effects  may  go  in  opposite  direction.  Our  instrument  is  
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correlated with meth use but not the factors determining foster care admissions, so it is a likely 
candidate for overcoming simultaneity bias that could confound the OLS estimate. 
  The 1995 and 1997 precursor control policies increased the cost of meth production—
shifting the supply curve for meth upward and increasing prices for consumers. Consumption 
theoretically would have fallen as well. After producers substituted to alternative precursors, 
production costs would be expected to fall to their pre-interdiction levels. Thus the regulations 
cause deviations in the price of meth from their general trend line. We use the deviation of meth 
prices  from  the  national  trend  as  our  instrumental  variable.  To  identify  the  effect  of  the 
regulations on meth admissions, we estimated the following equation in the first stage of a two-
stage model:  
log(self-referred meth treatment rate)st = α1price deviation t + α2Xst + γs + φt + τt + ust, 
where  log(meth  treatment  rate)st  is  the  log  of  the  number  of  self-referred  meth  treatment 
admissions for whites per 100,000 whites aged 15–49 years in state s during month t, price 
deviationt equals the deviation in the expected price of meth from its trend line during precursor 
regulations and equals zero otherwise, γs is a state fixed effect, φt is a month fixed effect, τt is a 
linear time trend common to all states, and Xst is a vector of covariates including the cigarette 
tax, state unemployment rate, and the log of the alcohol treatment rate for whites. 
The second-stage equation estimates the relationship between meth admissions and foster 
care admissions: 
log(first entry foster care rate)st = β1log(self-referred meth treatment rate)st 
+ β2Xst + δs + λt + ωt + est,  
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where log(first entry foster care rate)st is the log of first entries into foster care for whites per 
100,000 whites aged 0–19 years in state s during month t, δs is a state fixed effect, λt is a month 
fixed effect, and ωt is a linear time trend common to all states. 
The parameter of interest is β1, the elasticity of the first entry foster care rate with respect 
to  the  self-referred  meth  treatment  rate.  For  β1  to  be  consistent,  the  deviation  in  price  that 
occurred during the treatment window must be both correlated with meth treatment admissions 
and uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage. As we will report, the spike in prices 
during the intervention window had very large, negative effects on meth treatment admissions. 
The argument for excluding the prices cannot be tested, but Figure 4 shows that there were no 
corresponding  changes  in  the  prices  of  heroin  or  cocaine  and  crack  during  the  two  meth 




Because AFCARS foster care data contain information on the route of admission, we estimate 
several models separately. AFCARS records indicate whether a child was removed because of 
parental drug abuse, parental incarceration, parental physical abuse, or parental neglect. We find 
evidence  that  meth  abuse  causes  increases  in  child  maltreatment  channels  of  foster  care 
admissions. We also find evidence that meth treatment may cause foster care admissions to 
decrease, since during the episodes that we examine, we find a strong and negative causal effect 
of self-referral meth treatment on the number of children flowing into foster care via the parental 
incarceration route of admission.  
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Table 4 shows the results of our baseline model. Each pair of columns shows a different 
dependent variable: first, all foster care admissions for whites, and then broken down by route 
into foster care. Many of our OLS estimates are smaller in magnitude than our 2SLS estimates. 
For example, the 2SLS estimate in the total first entries into foster care model is almost eight 
times larger than the OLS estimate. Our 2SLS models in all cases have strong first stages as 
measured by the F-statistic (>10). We find that a 1% increase in meth treatment causes a 0.48% 
increase in foster care admissions. This positive effect is likely a reflection of the causal effect of 
meth use, as opposed to treatment, on child maltreatment. Other covariates in our model were 
also  significant:  unemployment  was  associated  with  lower  incidence  of  child  maltreatment, 
possibly reflecting the effect of the business cycle on state budgets. Cigarette taxes and alcohol 
treatment were both associated with decreases in foster care admissions. 
Next  we  examine  the  effect  of  meth  use  on  foster  care  by  route  of  admission. 
Interestingly, we find that meth treatment admissions causes foster care admissions to fall for 
those children whose parents were incarcerated. A 1% increase in meth treatment admissions 
causes foster care removal due to parental incarceration to fall by 1.95%. A negative elasticity is 
consistent with a causal effect of meth treatment on child maltreatment, as opposed to meth use 
per  se.  We  hypothesize  that  when  parents  seek  treatment  for  meth  abuse,  their  meth  use 
decreases, lowering the risk of arrest and imprisonment, and in turn, reduces the number of 
children removed because of parental incarceration. For both child neglect and child abuse, we 
estimate  positive  elasticities  of  0.66  and  0.77,  respectively.  Unlike  parental  incarceration,  a 
positive  elasticity  is  likely  estimating  the  causal  effect  of  parental  meth  abuse  on  child 
maltreatment directly. We do not find any statistically significant effect for the other routes.  
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Between 1994 and 2000, the foster care population grew from 468,000 to 552,000, a rise 
of 18% (see Figure 1). During the same period, the number of annual meth treatments increased 
approximately 20% (see Figure 8). If we use the estimated elasticity of 0.48 from the baseline 
model, this suggests that meth use caused a 9.6% increase in foster care admissions, or roughly 
half of the growth. Stated another way, if, in 1994, precursor controls had successfully eradicated 




We  conducted  several  robustness  checks  to  strengthen  the  credibility  of  our  baseline 
results. First, we control for state-specific linear time trends, causing all identification to come 
from variation around a state’s trend (Table 5). Qualitatively, our results are unchanged, though 
magnitudes and precision changed in some cases. Controlling for state trends strengthened the 
first stage in all cases. Our 2SLS estimates for the total first entries model are smaller and less 
precise  than  what  we  estimated  without  state  trends,  while  our  estimate  for  the  parental 
incarceration channel is smaller in magnitude (by almost a third) and is no longer statistically 
significant. Both child neglect and child abuse remain positive and precisely estimated, but are 
smaller  in  magnitude  than  our  results  from  Table  4.  The  effect  of  meth  treatment  on  other 
channels is also significant using 2SLS. 
We also implement a placebo test in which black foster care admissions were regressed 
onto black meth treatment using OLS and 2SLS. As only 3% of meth users are black, there 
should not be any effect of meth use on foster care admissions. We do not find any discernible  
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effect of black meth use on black foster care using 2SLS (Table 6). A caveat here is that this is 
not a high-powered test because the first-stage provides very little identification for blacks. 
As a last robustness check, we use separate measures of our dependent variable, the 
instrumental  variable,  controls  for  cocaine  and  heroin  abuse  and  different  sample  selections 
(Table 7). We report the baseline results from Table 4 for comparison. First, we use the date of 
latest entry instead of first entry for those states that consistently reported it over the entire panel 
to measure the number of children in foster care. This caused our sample to fall 40% since early 
reporting for “latest entry” was not reported by every state in the earliest part of the AFCARS 
panel in several states. Nevertheless, using this measurement causes our estimates to become 
more precise (p<0.001) and larger (0.78 vs. 0.47).  
We also estimate the effect of meth admissions on the ratio of the number of children 
leaving foster care in a state/month/year (exit) to the number coming in (entry). We ultimately do 
not find any effect of meth admissions on this outcome, suggesting that the effects we are finding 
are primarily driven by changes in new children coming into the system. 
Next, we instrument for meth treatment with state-varying price deviations instead of the 
national measure of price used in earlier regressions. Because some states have so few meth 
purchases by law enforcement, this instrument has more noise over the panel for several states. 
The first stage has an F-statistic of 7.97, and though this suggests a weak instrument problem, 
the  Anderson-Rubin  test  (unreported)  reports  that  estimates  are  robust  to  weak  instruments 
(p<0.05). We estimate a positive elasticity of 0.70, though the estimate is less precise (p<0.10). 
We  also  experiment  with  the  composition  of  the  state  sample  itself.  Since  meth  is 
concentrated in the Pacific Northwest, Western, Midwest and Southwestern states, we limit our 
sample to only those states in the top 50% of the distribution of meth rates in 1994. Dropping  
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those states in the lower half of the distribution slightly increased the magnitude of our estimated 
elasticity (0.51 vs. 0.47) and caused the precision to increase slightly. So as to determine whether 
our results were being driven by spurious contemporaneous drug abuse patterns, we estimated 
our baseline model with additional controls for heroin and cocaine/crack admissions. Including 
these controls causes the precision of our meth elasticity estimates to decrease slightly (p<0.10), 
but has almost no effect on the size or sign of the elasticity itself (0.48 vs. 0.47).  
Finally, we limit our sample to 1997–2002 so that we could examine whether inconsistent 
data  quality  for  some  states  in  the  early  part  of  the  AFCARS  sample  affects  our  estimates. 
Dropping 1995 and 1996 improves our confidence in data quality, but also requires that we 
exploit only the variation in meth caused by the 1997 pseudoephedrine regulation. This causes 
the strength of our instrumental variable to increase (F=18.42), as well as the coefficient on our 
instrument in the first stage to more than double (-0.0008 vs. -0.0004). The estimated elasticity 
fell slightly from 0.4770 to 0.4253 while increasing in precision (p<0.001). A similar elasticity 
across the two samples suggests that meth consumers are myopic with regards to the price series. 
If meth abusers were assumed to be rational and forward-looking, they presumably forecast a 
shorter spike in the price series in 1997 since they possess more information about the short 
duration  of  deviation  in  price  caused  by  the  1995  shock.  And  yet  while  we  do  find  some 
evidence for this since the 1997-only identification of meth’s effect on foster care is lower than 
that  when  we  use  both  1995  and  1997,  it  is  not  considerably  smaller  in  size.  This  lack  of 
differential responsiveness may shed some light on the nature of addiction itself by implying 
future predicted prices are either not forecast or are not incorporated into the calculus of a meth 
user’s consumption decision.
8 
                                                 




The  1988  Chemical  Diversion  and  Trafficking  Act  regulated  the  bulk  distribution  of  all 
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine products, but granted exemptions to all tablet forms of ephedrine 
and pseudoephedrine, leading ultimately to a large underground supply chain that utilized only 
tablets. Congress corrected for this legal loophole in 1995 and 1997 by expanding regulations to 
tablet ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, respectively. These follow-up corrections, as we have 
documented, caused major disruptions in the market for d-meth by quadrupling (doubling) real 
purity-adjusted prices in 1995 (1997), which led to declines in meth admissions. The impact on 
meth markets was so profound that some have suggested that these interdictions may be the 
greatest  disruption  in  the  supply  of  any  illicit  substance  in  the  history  of  drug  enforcement 
(Dobkin and Nicosia 2009). 
By exogenously decreasing meth use, these two episodes provide researchers with an 
opportunity to answer empirical questions regarding substance abuse that have otherwise been 
difficult. Although we are careful not to extrapolate our findings beyond these episodes or to 
other  abused  substances,  our  findings  are  strongly  suggestive  that  parental  meth  use  harms 
children to such an extreme degree that it triggers out-of-home placements into foster care. Since 
the  amount  of  child  maltreatment  is  only  partially  captured  by  foster  care  admissions,  and 
because meth use is highly concentrated in rural areas where welfare resources are considerably 
more strained, it is possible the effects are actually larger than what is estimated here. 
Because of the information recorded about foster care enrollments, we were also able to 
determine the precise channels through which meth use was transformed into foster care. First, 
meth use appears to cause parents to neglect their children and to physically abuse them. Foster  
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care placement is an extreme case—it occurs only when the damage is severe. Thus the effect of 
meth use on milder levels of neglect and abuse may be even more pronounced than we can 
measure here. 
One implication, therefore, is that an argument could be made that a greater allocation of 
public  resources  to  meth  treatment  and  foster  care  is  needed  in  areas  with  growing  meth 
problems. As these areas have historically been mostly rural, they may already be underserved. 
As meth continues to move eastward, public officials should be prepared for the impact that 
parental use will have on children in communities. 
Lastly, we conclude that there exists a negative elasticity of foster care enrollment due to 
the incarceration of the child’s parents with respect to underlying meth treatment. This likely 
reflects the causal effect of meth treatment on child maltreatment. Treatment causes parents to 
stop using drugs while in treatment and for some after release as well. Treatment is relevant, in 
part, because it keeps a parent clean so that they cannot be arrested, and therefore, not lose their 
child due to incarceration. This causal mechanism suggests that one way to reduce foster care 
caseloads is to allocate more resources towards drug treatment. Earlier studies such as Rydell et 
al. (1996) and Jofre-Bonet (2001) have argued that treatment resources are currently suboptimal.  
Meth  treatment  could  potentially  pay  for  itself  by  reducing  both  foster  care  and 
incarceration  levels,  which  have  also  reached  historic  heights.  Understanding  the  relative 
efficacy of supply versus demand anti-drug policies is crucial to lowering the social costs of 
substance abuse. Anderson (2010) shows that one particular type of demand intervention—an 
advertising campaign in Minnesota to raise meth awareness—was not effective at reducing meth 
abuse among teenagers. Our findings, on the other hand, show that treatment (another type of 
demand intervention) can reduce some of the social costs associated with meth use, which leads  
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to  the  natural  question  as  to  under  what  circumstances  do  these  different  types  of  demand 
interventions prove to be effective. It may be that meth is unusual in that because its inputs are 
concentrated, policies aimed at limiting access to them can have stimulating effects on even 
demand  policies  as  well.  Research  that  compares  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  efficacy  of 
different  types  of  supply  and  demand  interventions  are  therefore  critically  important  for  the 
construction of useful social policy in this area.  
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Table 1:  Foster care selected descriptive statistics, Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and 
Reporting System (AFCARS), 1994–2000 
  Mean   
Child characteristics  (S.D.)  Obs. 
Female  0.48  8,376,410 
     
White  0.54  7,485,566 
     
Black  0.41  7,485,566 
     
Other race  0.05  7,485,566 
     
Hispanic ethnicity  0.18  7,123,489 
     
Age at first removal  6.89  8,101,436 
  (5.44)   
Age at latest removal  7.18  8,355,884 
  (5.51)   
Total number of removals  1.29  8,300,811 
  (0.72)   
     
Route of most recent removal     
Parental drug abuse  0.16  7,567,806 
     
Parental abuse  0.17  7,623,928 
     
Parental neglect  0.52  7,645,084 
     
Parental incarceration  0.05  7,496,838 
     
Notes:  Authors’ calculations from AFCARS. Children may have no reported route or more 
than one route of admission to foster care, so proportions may not add to one.   
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Table 2:  Drug abuse treatment episodes selected descriptive statistics, TEDS, 1994–2000 






Alcohol  0.74  0.57 
Cocaine or crack  0.35  0.19 
Marijuana  0.35  0.50 
Heroin  0.18  0.08 
Methamphetamine  0.08  1.00 
     
Individual characteristics     
White  0.60  0.83 
Black  0.26  0.03 
Hispanic  0.11  0.10 
     
Source of referral     
Self  0.34  0.31 
Criminal justice system  0.33  0.37 
Drug abuse treatment provider  0.12  0.08 
Other health provider  0.07  0.07 
School  0.01  0.01 
Employer  0.01  0.01 
Other  0.08  0.13 
     
Number of patients  9,025,485  690,951 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations from TEDS.   
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Table 3:  State-varying variables selected descriptive statistics, whites (for AFCARS and TEDS 
variables), 1994–2000 
Variables  Source  Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
Foster care at first date of entry  AFCARS  3,417  24.26  22.27  0  250.03 
Foster care at latest date of entry   1,869  34.63  25.63  0  260.04 
 -by parental incarceration    1,869  2.01  4.18  0  71.68 
 -by parental neglect    1,869  14.64  13.85  0  237.48 
 -by parental drug abuse    1,869  4.66  6.59  0  126.20 
 -by parental abuse    1,869  6.16  7.74  0  82.52 
             
Meth admissions  TEDS  3,256  11.38  17.92  0  163.79 
 -by self-referral route  3,256  2.72  4.53  0  48.36 
Alcohol admissions    3,256  160.62  149.48  0.54 1,189.31 
Cocaine/crack admissions    3,256  71.38  63.37  0.35  432.06 
Heroin admissions    3,256  30.45  58.53  0.00  451.54 
             
Unemployment rate  BLS  3,417  4.70  1.32  1.70  9.60 
Cigarette tax per pack (2002 $)  Orzechowski and 
Walker (2008) 
3,417  0.32  0.20  0.02  1.06 
Notes:  AFCARS variables are measured relative to 100,000 white children aged 0–19 years. 
TEDS variables are measured relative to 100,000 whites aged 156–49 years. The 
number of observations for first date of entry, latest date of entry and the entry into 
foster care under latest date of entry differ because not all states reported latest date of 
entry, but those states that did also reported the avenue into foster care. 
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Table 4:  OLS and 2SLS regressions of foster care admissions on meth treatment admissions, whites, 1994–2000 
  Log first entry foster care rate 
Log latest entry via parental 
incarceration rate 
Log latest entry via child 
neglect rate 
Covariates  OLS (1)  2SLS (2)  OLS (3)  2SLS (4)  OLS (5)  2SLS (6) 
Log self-referred meth treatment rate  0.0608***  0.4770**  0.0760  -1.9537***  -0.0154  0.6608** 
   (0.0222)  (0.2412)  (0.0688)  (0.7510)  (0.0419)  (0.3123) 
Unemployment rate  -0.065***  -0.0642***  -0.5483***  -0.5694***  -0.0726**  -0.0548 
  (0.0183)  (0.0210)  (0.1127)  (0.1280)  (0.0323)  (0.0415) 
Cigarette tax per pack  -1.0317***  -0.8278***  0.0541  -0.3449  -0.3933***  -0.2219 
  (0.0852)  (0.1478)  (0.4095)  (0.4208)  (0.1089)  (0.1429) 
Log alcohol treatment rate  -0.2127***  -0.5629***  -0.1284  1.6747**  -0.0725  -0.6580** 
  (0.0326)  (0.2058)  (0.1180)  (0.6757)  (0.0558)  (0.2749) 
Month fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
State fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Linear time trend  x  x  x  x  x  x 
First stage             
Price deviation instrument    -0.0004***    -0.0008***    -0.0006*** 
    (0.0001)    (0.0002)    (0.0001) 
F-statistic for IV in first stage    13.23    19.04    16.25 
R
2  0.869  0.834  0.702  0.411  0.732  0.609 
N  1,633  1,633  801  801  948  948  
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Log latest entry via parental 
drug abuse rate 
Log latest entry via physical 
abuse rate 
Log latest entry via other 
routes rate 
  OLS (7)  2SLS (8)  OLS (9)  2SLS (10)  OLS (11)  2SLS (12) 
Log self-referred meth treatment rate  0.1603**  -1.3516  0.0814**  0.7718**  0.1571**  -0.2354 
   (0.0635)  (1.1998)  (0.0393)  (0.3359)  (0.0789)  (0.4651) 
Unemployment  -0.6385***  -0.7353***  -0.1085***  -0.0893**  -0.0777  -0.0869 
  (0.1105)  (0.1408)  (0.0335)  (0.0400)  (0.0562)  (0.0559) 
Cigarette tax per pack  0.5777  0.1699  -0.1582  0.0166  -1.1407***  -1.2258*** 
  (0.4771)  (0.5223)  (0.1198)  (0.1562)  (0.2038)  (0.2562) 
Log alcohol treatment rate  -0.2974***  1.0355  -0.0348  -0.6326**  -0.1275  0.2139 
  (0.0892)  (1.0617)  (0.0522)  (0.2934)  (0.0979)  (0.4056) 
Month fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
State fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Linear time trend  x  x  x  x  x  x 
First stage             
Price deviation instrument    -0.0006***    -0.0006***    -0.0005*** 
    (0.0002)    (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
F-statistic for IV in first stage    15.85    15.88    14.50 
R
2  0.802  0.695  0.76  0.649  0.83  0.817 
N  853  853  940  940  936  936 
Notes:  “All foster care placements” is a measure of the flow of natural log of the sum of all new foster care admissions per capita 
by state, race and month using the latest date of entry to denote the time of entry. Other models denote the flow of children 
into foster care via a given route of admission denoted by the column heading. Asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.   
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Table 5:  OLS and 2SLS regressions of foster care admissions on meth treatment admissions with state time trends, whites, 1994–
2000 
 
Log first entry foster care 
rate 
Log latest entry via parental 
incarceration rate 
Log latest entry via child 
neglect rate 
Covariates  OLS (1)  2SLS (2)  OLS (3)  2SLS (4)  OLS (5)  2SLS (6) 
Log self-referred meth treatment rate  0.0995***  0.3297*  0.1273**  -0.3815  0.0679**  0.3554** 
   (0.0194)  (0.1683)  (0.0632)  (0.3704)  (0.0270)  (0.1500) 
Unemployment  -0.0654***  -0.0537**  -0.1098  -0.1211*  -0.0506**  -0.0304 
  (0.0185)  (0.0214)  (0.0745)  (0.0728)  (0.0248)  (0.0280) 
Cigarette tax per pack  -0.4980***  -0.4993***  -2.7849***  -2.8075***  0.0629  0.1054 
  (0.0955)  (0.0878)  (0.5713)  (0.5343)  (0.1056)  (0.1065) 
Log alcohol treatment rate  -0.1801***  -0.3655***  -0.2081**  0.2209  -0.1025***  -0.3427*** 
  (0.0258)  (0.1364)  (0.1028)  (0.3270)  (0.0349)  (0.1274) 
Month fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
State fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Linear time trend  x  x  x  x  x  x 
State linear time trends  x  x  x  x  x  x 
First stage             
Price deviation instrument    -0.0004***    -0.0011***    -0.0007*** 
    (0.0001)    (0.0002)    (0.0001) 
F-statistic for IV in first stage    19.05    31.31    25.26 
R
2  0.923    0.835    0.889   
N  1,633  1,633  801  801  948  948  
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Log latest entry via parental 
drug abuse rate 
Log latest entry via physical 
abuse rate 
Log latest entry via other 
routes rate 
Covariates  OLS (7)  2SLS (8)  OLS (9)  2SLS (10)  OLS (11)  2SLS (12) 
Log self-referred meth treatment rate  0.1758***  -0.0736  0.0760**  0.4730**  0.0331  0.4168** 
   (0.0486)  (0.3839)  (0.0339)  (0.1841)  (0.0378)  (0.1839) 
Unemployment  -0.2002***  -0.2199***  0.0004  0.0290  -0.0156  0.0126 
  (0.0658)  (0.0631)  (0.0316)  (0.0353)  (0.0379)  (0.0415) 
Cigarette tax per pack  -3.3908***  -3.4316***  0.0797  0.1380  -0.2567*  -0.2010* 
  (0.5855)  (0.5436)  (0.1167)  (0.1149)  (0.1312)  (0.1213) 
Log alcohol treatment rate  -0.2322***  -0.0169  -0.0345  -0.3660**  -0.0404  -0.3593** 
  (0.0689)  (0.3296)  (0.0494)  (0.1605)  (0.0587)  (0.1653) 
Month fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
State fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Linear time trend  x  x  x  x  x  x 
State linear time trends  x  x  x  x  x  x 
First stage             
Price deviation instrument    -0.0008***    -0.0007***    -0.0007*** 
    (0.0002)    (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
F-statistic for IV in first stage    23.85    24.91    23.93 
R
2  0.917    0.852    0.940   
N  853  853  940  940  936  936 
Notes:  Models are similar to those estimated in Table 4 but with the addition of state-specific linear time trends. Asterisks ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
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Table 6:  OLS and 2SLS regressions of foster care admissions on meth treatment admissions, blacks, 1994–2000 
  Log first entry foster care rate 
Log latest entry via parental 
incarceration rate 
Log latest entry via child 
neglect rate 
Covariates  OLS (1)  2SLS (2)  OLS (3)  2SLS (4)  OLS (5)  2SLS (6) 
Log self-referred meth treatment rate  0.0707***  7.9756  -0.3181***  0.3744  0.0392  -2.6323 
   (0.0247)  (47.6284)  (0.0878)  (1.2135)  (0.0398)  (7.6246) 
Unemployment  -0.0144  -0.3378  -0.6765***  -0.7357***  -0.1509***  -0.1490 
  (0.0352)  (1.9608)  (0.1309)  (0.1581)  (0.0509)  (0.1736) 
Cigarette tax per pack  -1.0048***  -2.3526  -0.0761  -0.1870  -0.2370**  -0.1785 
  (0.0967)  (8.1520)  (0.3968)  (0.4305)  (0.1066)  (0.5599) 
Log alcohol treatment rate  -0.1362***  -2.0373  -0.1987*  -0.3324  -0.1100  0.4732 
  (0.0419)  (11.4883)  (0.1171)  (0.2800)  (0.0777)  (1.6648) 
Month fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
State fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Linear time trend  x  x  x  x  x  x 
First stage             
Price deviation instrument    -0.00004    0.0005    0.0001 
    (0.00026)    (0.0004)    (0.0003) 
F-statistic for IV in first stage    0.03    2.11    0.11 
R
2  0.865    0.745    0.798   
N  886  886  377  377  489  489  
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Log latest entry via parental 
drug abuse rate 
Log latest entry via physical 
abuse rate 
Log latest entry via other 
routes rate 
Covariates  OLS (7)  2SLS (8)  OLS (9)  2SLS (10)  OLS (11)  2SLS (12) 
Log self-referred meth treatment rate  0.1739**  15.2527  -0.0213  1.4385  0.0884  -4.5940 
   (0.0764)  (33.1188)  (0.0437)  (5.9543)  (0.0828)  (21.0517) 
Unemployment  -0.4376***  -1.0472  -0.1524***  -0.1546  -0.0422  -0.1064 
  (0.1328)  (1.8277)  (0.0473)  (0.1054)  (0.0890)  (0.4121) 
Cigarette tax per pack  1.4767**  -0.4781  -0.3691**  -0.4029  -2.1697***  -1.9868 
  (0.5708)  (5.4135)  (0.1688)  (0.3673)  (0.2996)  (1.3382) 
Log alcohol treatment rate  -0.0388  -3.1352  -0.0386  -0.3573  0.0281  1.0912 
  (0.1373)  (6.9492)  (0.0617)  (1.3055)  (0.1298)  (4.7746) 
Month fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
State fixed effects  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Linear time trend  x  x  x  x  x  x 
First stage             
Price deviation instrument    0.0001    0.0001    0.0001 
    (0.0004)    (0.0003)    (0.0003) 
F-statistic for IV in first stage    0.17    0.07    0.04 
R
2   0.837    0.774    0.880   
N  430  430  472  472  486  486 
Notes:  Models are similar to those estimated in Table 4 but with the black AFCARS and TEDS subsamples used to create the 
foster care, meth treatment, and alcohol treatment rates. Asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively.  
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Table 7:  Various robustness checks, whites, 1994–2000 (except as specified) 
 
Log first entry foster 
care rate baseline 
(Table 4, 
Columns 1 and 2) 
Log latest entry foster 
care rate 
Log of ratio of latest exit 
to latest entry (exit rate) 
Log first entry foster 
care rate with state-
varying price deviation 
instruments 
Covariates  OLS (1)  2SLS (2)  OLS (3)  2SLS (4)  OLS (5)  2SLS (6)  OLS (7)  2SLS (8) 
Log self-referred meth treatment 
rate  0.0608***  0.4770**  0.0117  0.7848***  0.0277  0.1453  0.0608***  0.7005* 
  (0.0222)  (0.2412)  (0.0242)  (0.2527)  (0.0441)  (0.3507)  (0.0222)  (0.4114) 
First stage                 
Price deviation instrument    -0.0004***    -0.0005***    -0.0005***    -0.0003*** 
    (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0001) 
F-statistic for IV in first stage    13.23    15.71    15.67    7.87 
R
2  0.869    0.857    0.727    0.869   
N  1,633  1,633  968  968  933  933  1,633  1,633 
 
Log first entry foster 
care rate using sample of 
highest meth-using states 
in 1992 
Log first entry foster 
care rate with additional 
heroin and cocaine/crack 
treatment controls 
 Log first entry foster 
care rate using 1997–
2000 balanced panel 
sample period   
Covariates  OLS (9)  2SLS (10)  OLS (11)  2SLS (12)  OLS (13)  2SLS (14)     
Log self-referred meth treatment 
rate  0.0831***  0.5127**  0.0397  0.4678*  0.0205  0.4253***     
  (0.0300)  (0.2354)  (0.0251)  (0.2792)  (0.0190)  (0.1538)     
First stage                 
Price deviation instrument    -0.0005***    -0.0004***    -0.0008***     
    (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0002)     
F-statistic for IV in first stage    14.94    11.08    18.42     
R
2  0.904    0.870    0.923       
N  1,225  1,225  1,585  1,585  848  848     
Note:  All models include the baseline controls from Table 4 but the parameter estimates are suppressed for brevity. Asterisks 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Sources:  Authors’ calculations from TEDS. The upper graph shows the number of meth 
treatment episodes per 100,000 whites in each state from September 1994 to August 




Figure 3:  Percentiles (5th, 25th, median, 75th, 95th) of expected retail price of pure gram of 
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Notes:  Authors’ calculations from STRIDE. Expected price estimates come from random 
coefficient models of both purity and price, following the methodology of Arkes et al. 
(2004). Estimates from these models are available from the authors. Prices are 




Figure 4:  Median monthly expected prices of meth, heroin, and cocaine relative to median 


















Notes:  Authors’ calculations from STRIDE. Expected price estimates come from random 
coefficient models of both purity and price, following the methodology of Arkes et al. 
(2004). Estimates from these models are available from the authors. Prices are 




Figure 5:  Construction of the instrumental variable as deviations from the national meth price 
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Notes:  Authors’ calculations from STRIDE. Dots represent individual observations for the 
expected price of pure meth. The smooth curve is the quadratic monthly time trend of 
expected meth prices. The bottom dark line is the instrumental variable—equal to 
zero outside of the supply interventions, and equal to the deviation off the trend 













































Figure 7:  Proportion of monthly foster care admissions reporting a particular route of 























Notes:  Authors’ calculations from AFCARS. Child welfare workers may report no reasons 
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Notes:  Authors’ calculations from TEDS. Patients can report the use of more than one drug. 
 